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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to identify the most important knowledge gaps on interprovincial
barriers to labour mobility in Canada, and to shed some light on potential conceptual,
methodological, and data issues associated with research in this area.  Consequently, it provides
an overview of the current state of play with respect to the most important issues relating to
inter-provincial barriers to labour mobility within the Canadian internal market.  The three main
barriers to labour mobility in Canada, which are considered, are:  residency requirements; certain
practices regarding occupational licensing, certification and registration; and differences in how
occupational qualifications are recognized.  These are the main regulatory barriers that are to be
removed or reduced under Chapter 7, the Labour Mobility Chapter of the Agreement on Internal
Trade (AIT).  It also reviews critically the recent relevant research in Canada and in some other
jurisdictions (the United States, the European Union and Australia) on barriers to labour
mobility.  The paper finds that the most important knowledge gap concerns the extent of the
regulatory barriers to labour mobility and their impacts and costs.  It also concludes that there is
nothing fundamentally wrong with the approach of mutual recognition being pursued in Canada
to eliminate such regulatory barriers.  However, while there has been a fair degree of success in
Canada in achieving occupation-specific Mutual Recognition Agreements for occupational
qualifications and reconciliation of differences in occupational standards, this progress has been
too slow.  Moreover, the functioning of the dispute resolution mechanism with respect to
Chapter 7, is overly complex and inaccessible.  The dispute resolution mechanism in the Alberta-
B.C. Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement is stronger and simpler than that of the
AIT, and definitely one to be considered as a model to improve the AIT.
Key words:  labour, labour mobility, internal markets, internal trade
Résumé
Cette étude a pour objectif de cerner les principales lacunes en matière d’information sur les
obstacles interprovinciaux à la mobilité de la main-d’oeuvre au Canada et d’éclaircir les
questions éventuelles de concept, de méthodologie et de données liées à la recherche dans ce
domaine. Par conséquent, elle donne un aperçu de la situation actuelle pour ce qui est des plus
importantes questions relatives aux obstacles interprovinciaux à la mobilité de la main-d’oeuvre
à l’intérieur du marché canadien. Les trois principaux obstacles à l’étude sont : les exigences en
matière de résidence; certaines pratiques concernant l’autorisation d’exercer, la reconnaissance
professionnelle et l’immatriculation des travailleurs; les différences dans la reconnaissance des
qualifications professionnelles. Il s’agit là des plus importants obstacles réglementaires qui
devront être supprimés ou atténués dans le cadre du chapitre 7 (Mobilité de la main-d’oeuvre) de
l’Accord sur le commerce intérieur (ACI). L’étude fait également une recension des plus
récentes recherches effectuées dans ce domaine au Canada et ailleurs (États-Unis, Union
européenne et Australie). Selon elle, l’étendue des obstacles réglementaires à la mobilité de la
main-d’oeuvre, ainsi que leurs effets et leurs coûts, constituent les éléments où le manque
d’information est le plus important. Toujours selon l’étude, la politique de reconnaissance
mutuelle que vise le Canada en vue de supprimer de tels obstacles réglementaires n’a rien de
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fondamentalement déraisonnable. Toutefois, bien que l’on ait enregistré d’assez bons résultats au
Canada en matière de conclusion d’accords de reconnaissance mutuelle pour les qualifications
professionnelles et l’abolition des différences sur le plan des normes professionnelles, il a fallu
trop de temps pour en arriver là. En outre, le mécanisme de règlement des différends dans le
cadre du chapitre 7 de l’ACI s’avère trop complexe et inaccessible. Par rapport à ce mécanisme,
celui de l’entente sur le commerce, l’investissement et la mobilité de la main-d’oeuvre qu’ont
conclue l’Alberta et la Colombie-Britannique est plus simple et plus contraignant. Il constitue
incontestablement un modèle à considérer en vue d’améliorer l’ACI.
Mots-clés : main-d’oeuvre, mobilité de la main-d’oeuvre, marchés intérieurs, commerce
intérieur
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INTRODUCTION 
Ten years after the implementation of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT), in 1994,
there was growing disappointment among those in government and business with the slow
progress that was being made in removing  barriers to trade, investment and labour mobility. 
Concerned to reenergize the process, the Council of the Federation reaffirmed their governments’
commitment to promoting internal trade in 2004 and established an ambitious workplan for
trade, labour and other ministries.
Last April the governments of British Columbia and Alberta concluded a Trade,
Investment, and  Labour Mobility Agreement (TILMA) that represented a fundamentally
different approach that went well beyond the AIT.  It  raised further questions about the need for
governments to take steps to improve the AIT.
Last October Premier Doer of Manitoba reported back to the Council of the Federation on
an action plan reached at the September meeting of the Committee on Internal Trade.  An
important part of that plan is a strategy to improve labour mobility developed by the Forum of
Labour Market Ministers (FLMM) in response to direction from the Council of the Federation. 
Its objective is to enable Canadians to work anywhere in Canada without restrictions by April 1,
2009. The achievement of this ambitious objective will require the full compliance by all
provincial professional and occupational regulatory bodies.
In addition,  the Senate Committee on Banking, Trade and Commerce has been holding
hearings on internal trade. The members have been pushing witnesses hard for information on the
costs of barriers and on the benefits in terms of increased productivity and competitiveness to be
derived by removing them. The Senate Committee’s report when it becomes available later this
year should further highlight the importance of removing interprovincial barriers, including those
to labour mobility.
The pursuit of a more ambitious policy agenda to remove barriers to internal trade would
be facilitated by a research program on the economic impact of these barriers. Consequently,
Industry Canada and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada have convoked a
roundtable to prepare a new comprehensive research program on the economic costs of internal
trade and labour mobility restrictions.  The plan is to have the resulting draft research papers
prepared in time for a major conference on the subject to be held next year.
This purpose of this paper is to provide useful background material for the roundtable
participants on the policy and research issues and to offer some possible research proposals to
help kick off the discussions of research priorities. Consequently, it  provides an overview of the
current state of play with respect to the most important issues relating to inter-provincial barriers
to labour mobility within the Canadian internal market.  It also reviews critically the recent
relevant research in Canada and in some other jurisdictions on barriers to labour mobility. Its
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purpose is to identify the most important knowledge gaps, and to shed some light on potential
conceptual, methodological, and data issues.
The three main barriers to labour mobility in Canada, which are considered, are:
residency requirements; certain practices regarding occupational licensing, certification and
registration; and differences in how occupational qualifications are recognized.  These are the
main regulatory barriers that are to be removed or reduced under Chapter 7, the Labour Mobility
Chapter of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).
More specifically, this paper contains sections in which we:
• summarize the economic impact of barriers to labour mobility in theory; 
• review the trends in net interprovincial migration;
• discuss the objective of professional and occupational regulation;
• profile the regulated professions and occupations;
• summarize and assess the AIT approach to eliminating interprovincial barriers to
labour mobility;
• assess the results of the 2004/05 survey of labour mobility in Canada;
• examine the functioning of the dispute settlement mechanism under Chapter 7 and
the disputes that have arisen and their status;
• review the current state of play regarding labour mobility under the AIT;
• consider the alternative approaches to labour mobility pursued in TILMA and its
advantages and disadvantages in comparison to the AIT;
• present the recent Ontario-Quebec Agreement on Construction and its
implications for labour mobility;
• review the approaches to barriers to labour mobility in the United States, the
European Union and Australia;
• compare labour mobility in Canada and other countries;
• survey the research on interprovincial labour mobility and the economic cost of
barriers;
• discuss potential conceptual, methodological, and data issues, including an
assessment of the potential value of the data sources on interprovincial labour
mobility at Statistics Canada; 
• outline the key knowledge gaps and recommend research priorities for the future;
and
• offer some concluding thoughts on the public policy options for reducing the costs
of regulatory barriers to the mobility of labour.
In preparing this paper, we benefitted from the useful input and helpful advice of officials
in Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Industry Canada, the Internal Trade
Secretariat, Statistics Canada, and the Internal Trade Representatives and Labour Mobility
Coordinators of most provinces and territories.
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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BARRIERS TO LABOUR MOBILITY
The economic impact of a barrier to interprovincial labour mobility can be better understood
using the simple labour supply and demand relationships shown in Chart 1. Without the barrier,
the labour supply would be S0 in both the labour-receiving and labour-origin provinces with
some labour leaving the labour-origin province to go to the labour-receiving province. The
equilibration of supply and demand in both provinces would result in a wage of W0 in both
provinces with wage sufficiently higher in the labour-receiving province to attract the labour
flow.  Employment in both provinces would be L0.  If a barrier to labour mobility such as a
restrictive licensing regime were imposed, it would restrict the flow of labour from the origin to
the receiving province. This would shift back the labour supply in the labour-receiving province
to S1 and shift the labour supply out in the labour-origin province to S1. The new equilibrium of
supply and demand would be at a wage of W1 with an employment level of L1 in both provinces.
The wage would be higher in the labour- receiving province than without the barriers and lower
in the labour-origin province. Correspondingly, the employment level would be lower in the
labour-receiving province and higher in the labour-origin province.  
The workers in the labour-receiving province, who earn higher wages as a result of the  barrier,
are the prime beneficiaries of the barrier. And the workers in the labour-origin provinces, who
earn lower wages,  are the main losers. But consumers of the goods and services in the labour-
receiving province are also losers and consumers in the labour-origin province gain. 
Nevertheless, the overall gains are always less than the benefits because the productivity of the
labour in the labour-origin province is always lower, which is the reason they earn lower wages
in the first place. Labour mobility promotes the overall economic efficiency in the country and
economic welfare. An exception to this might be if the barrier was really necessary to accomplish
a particular welfare objective, such as is discussed below. Then it would be necessary also to
take into consideration any benefit resulting from the barrier itself.
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NET INTERPROVINCIAL MIGRATION
The Canadian labour market is very dynamic with large population movements occurring in
response to evolving labour market conditions (Chart 2).  Net interprovincial migration
approached 2 per cent of population in the mid 1960s and has recently averaged near 1 per cent
of population.  This makes interprovincial labour flows a more important factor in meeting
labour demand for most provinces than international immigration.  Strong economic growth in
one province attracts workers and their families from other provinces where growth prospects are
less robust.  Workers tend to move from provinces with relatively high unemployment rates and
low wage rates to provinces with low unemployment rates and higher wages. The movement of
people mirrors the provincial business cycles. But the flows have typically been east to west with
Ontario mostly receiving an inflow,  but also experiencing an outflow during slowdowns or when
other provinces are particularly strong.  In 2005 and the first three quarters of 2006 alone net
migration to Alberta, driven by the energy boom, was 102,621. On the other hand, there was a
net out-migration of 40,637 from Ontario, 21,842 from the Atlantic provinces, and 15,635 from
Quebec. This testifies to the very important role that interprovincial labour mobility plays in
meeting labour demands in Canada and indicates that barriers are not so great that they prevent
the interprovincial flow of labour. 
There are three major kinds of barriers to labour mobility: natural such as distance, culture;
institutional such as employment insurance, pensions, minimum wages, and  health
insurance;  and language and regulatory such as professional and occupational licensing.  The
high level of labour mobility in Canada should not be surprising as four fifths of employment is
not in regulated professions or occupations where regulatory barriers exist.  An examination of
the significance of existing regulatory barriers requires a deeper analysis of the regulated
professions and occupations.
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THE OBJECTIVES OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION
Before considering the extent of employment in regulated professions and occupations
and regulatory barriers to labour mobility, it is useful to review briefly the objectives of these
regulations. They are set out in Article 713 of the AIT:
(a) public security and safety;
(b) public order;
(c) protection of human, animal or plant life or health;
(d) protection of the environment;
(e) consumer protection;
(f) protection of the health, well-being and safety of workers;
(g) affirmative action programs for disadvantaged groups;
(h) provision of adequate social and health measures to all its regions, and
(i) labour market development.
For greater certainty, “legitimate objective” includes cost containment in the health sector, such
as limiting the number of workers in a given occupation to limit public expenditures.
All of these objectives can be justified to some extent in terms of market failures whether
perceived or actual. The important thing is that they are all broadly recognized as “legitimate” by
Canadian governments and the public.  
From an economic point of view,  professional licensing and certification is viewed as a
way of dealing with agency problems. When an agent provides services to another person, there
can be a divergence of interests that leads the agent not to represent or serve the principal
perfectly. 
Various market mechanisms have developed to try to make sure that the agent acts in the
principal’s best interest. These include the licensing or certification of certain professions or
occupations. Such licensing or certification is done by government approved bodies and is
usually based on the satisfactory completion of a program of education or training or the
demonstration of competence through experience or examination. Professional associations are
usually involved in the establishment of qualifications and the imposition and enforcement of 
professional codes of ethics and standards of practice. Where consumers face informational
asymmetries in choosing professionals and it is difficult or impossible to assess qualifications,
licensing or certification of professionals can help to ensure that quality services are provided and
improve consumer welfare. Licensing is much more restrictive than certification as it prevents
non-licensed persons from practicing under pain of legal penalties. Certification limits itself to
meeting the information needs of consumers and leaves the ultimate choice as to service provider
in their hands.
From an economic point of view, professional and occupational regulation has minuses as
well as pluses. Oftentimes, regulatory bodies are captured by the professions that they are
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established to regulate. And licensing can be used in a self-serving way to restrict entry into the
profession and to raise the compensation of those in the field. This is why some economists led
by Milton Friedman (1962, pp.137-160) have opposed occupational licensure. 
Some of the concern expressed about regulatory barriers to labour mobility stems from
opposition to occupational regulation in general. It follows that if regulatory barriers primarily
reflect the rent-seeking behaviour of professionals, that the removal of the barriers will improve
economic welfare.  On the other hand, if the regulatory barriers really reflect legitimate
objectives, then their elimination could actually reduce economic welfare. 
PROFILE OF THE REGULATED PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS
In Ontario,  there are 39 regulated professions or occupations, which can be broken under
the following broad categories :
• Health Care (23): audiologist and speech pathologist, chiropodist, paramedic,
chiropractor,  dietitian , massage therapist, medical laboratory technologist,
medical radiation technologist,  midwife, naturopath,  nurse, occupational
therapist , optician , optometrist, physiotherapist, pharmacist, physician or
surgeon, psychologist , respiratory therapist , dental hygienist, dental technologist,
dentist, denturist;
• Financial Services (5):Certified General Accountant,  Certified Management
Accountant , Chartered Accountant; insurance broker, real estate agent;
• Engineering (2): engineer, engineering technician or technologist;
• Legal Services (2): lawyer, paralegal;
• Other (7): forester, funeral director, geoscientist , land surveyor, social worker,
teacher, veterinarian.
Although regulated professions and occupations differ from one province to another, an 
approximation of the number of workers covered  can be obtained from the census data (Table
1). The table also does not cover the construction trades, which are subject to more extensive
regulation in Quebec.   It also does not present numbers for some occupational groups that are
too small for reliable estimates.  These include:  acupuncturists; agrologists; community urban
planner; foresters; hearing aid practitioners; home economists; hunting guides; massage
therapists; naturopathic physicians; podiatrists; chiropodists; and psychiatric nurses.
There are approximately 1,725,215 workers in the included regulated occupations and
professions shown in Table 1. This represents 11.1 per cent of the labour force. The largest
groups, which account for three-quarters of the total, are: teachers; nurses; engineers; engineering
technicians and technologists; public accountants; physicians; and lawyers. Almost half of those
included are in teaching, the health professions or social work, which are in the public sector
where resource allocation is not dependent on the market. In these cases, it is more difficult to
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apply cost benefit analysis to calculate the costs barriers to labour mobility as the underlying
markets do not exist.
There is a perception in Canada that there are substantial regulatory barriers in Canada
affecting these professions. A survey published in the Financial Post on September 13, 2004
found that barriers to labour and professional mobility caused the most harm to the Canadian
economy and standard of living of the nine interprovincial trade barriers specifically mentioned. 
More than two-thirds of those queried characterized barriers to labour mobility to be very serious
or serious on a seven point scale. (COMPASS, 2004, pp.4-5).
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Table 1
An Estimate of the Number of Workers in Regulated Professions
and Occupations (Excluding Constuction Trades)
 
National
Occupational
Classification
Statistics
Canada
Classification
Number
of
Workers
Per cent
of Total
Teachers many E13 412,950 23.9
Registered Nurses    3152 D112 232,015 13.4
Engineers C03/C04 179,410 10.4
Accountants (Including
CGA, CMA, CA and
Public Accountant) 1111 B011 171,305 9.9
Engineering Technicians
and Technologists C13/C14 158,360 9.2
Physicians 3111/3112 D011/D012 65,525 3.8
Lawyers 4112 E012 64,445 3.7
Real Estate Agents 6232 G132 49,670 2.9
Licensed Practical Nurses 3233 D233 47,165 2.7
Social Workers 4152 E022 46,975 2.7
Dental Assistants 3411 D311 24,820 1.4
Pharmacists      3131 D031 23,900 1.4
Medical Laboratory
Technologists 3211 D211 18,475 1.1
Dental Specialist 3113 D013 18,105 1.0
Dentists 3113 D013 18,105 1.0
Paramedics 3234 D234 16,170 0.9
Psychologists 4151 E021 16,055 0.9
Physiotherapists 3142 D042 15,760 0.9
Medical Radiation
Technicians 3215 D215 14,270 0.8
Dental Hygienists 3222 D222 14,250 0.8
Translators 5125 F025 13,545 0.8
Architects 2151 C051 12,800 0.7
Geoscientists 2113 C013 10,140 0.6
Occupational Therapists 3143 D043 9,585 0.6
Dieticians/              
Nutritionists 3132 D032 8,705 0.5
Land Surveyors 2154 C054 8,095 0.5
Veterinarians 3114 D014 7,095 0.4
Respiratory Therapists 3214 D214 6,500 0.4
Audiologists and Speech
Pathologists 0311 D041 6,020 0.3
Dental Technicians or
Technologists 3223 D223 5,960 0.3
Opticians 3231 D231 5,865 0.3
Chiropractors    3122 D022 5,230 0.3
Midwives 3232 D232 5,170 0.3
Embalmers/ Funeral
Directors 6272 G912 4,455 0.3
Optometrists 3121 D021 3,725 0.2
Landscape Architects 2152 C052 2,415 0.1
Denturists 3221 D221 2,180 0.1
TOTAL 1,725,215 100.0
Source: Statistics Canada, 2001 Census.
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THE AIT APPROACH TO ELIMINATING INTERPROVINCIAL BARRIERS TO
LABOUR MOBILITY
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognized for the first time the mobility rights of
Canadians. Under it, 
6(2)  Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of
Canada has the right
(a)  to move to and take up residence in any province; and  
(b)  to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province. 
6 (3) The rights specified in subsection (2) are subject to 
(a)  any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those
that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous
residence; and  
(b)  any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the
receipt of publicly provided social services.  
However, the above-noted limitations on mobility rights still permitted barriers to labour
mobility in the regulated professions and occupations. That is why the federal government and
the provincial and territorial governments agreed to be bound by Chapter 7 of the Agreement on
Internal Trade. Its purpose is “to enable any worker qualified for an occupation in the territory of
a Party to be granted employment occupations in the territory of any other Party as provided in
this chapter.” (AIT, Article 701, p.89)
Chapter 7 of the AIT requires governments to bring their regulatory practices affecting
access to employment opportunities into conformity, above all, with the following three
requirements:
• No residency requirements (Article 706);
• Licensing, certification or registration requirements for out-of jurisdiction workers
relate principally to competence, and provide treatment no more burdensome than
what is imposed on their own workers (Article 707);
• Mutual recognition of occupational qualifications and reconciliation of differences
in occupational standards (Article 708).
The Agreement stipulates that the Parties will assess their occupational regulations to
determine where commonality exists and will take then take steps to reconcile or accommodate
the differences.   (Annex 708).  It has been found convenient to codify the assessments and
reconciliation in occupation-specific Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs).
MRAs are not required by the Agreement but they can greatly simplify its application.  By
codifying differences and defining processes to resolve disputes over labour mobility between
regulatory bodies, rather than between the parent governments that are the parties to the AIT
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itself, they also make dispute resolution less government-dominated and sometimes more flexible
and accessible.
In February 1999, as part of the Social Union Framework Agreement, First Ministers
(except for Quebec) agreed that the deadline for the full implementation of Chapter 7 of the AIT
was July 1, 2001. All the assessments and reconciliations of regulatory differences were
supposed to be completed by that date, but several occupations failed to meet the deadline for
completing MRAs and agreements continue to be negotiated.
There has been significant  progress in improving labour mobility since the AIT has come
into effect .  Non-conforming elements such as licensing and residency requirements have been
eliminated as a condition of employment.  According to the Labour Market Coordinating Group
(LMCG), as of January 2007, 30 of 50 occupations regulated in more than one jurisdiction have
MRAs covering most regulating jurisdictions, 16 have MRAs that have been signed by all
regulating jurisdictions, and only 4 do not yet have MRAs (Table 2). With a little more effort, it
should be possible to bring almost all regulated occupations under MRAs.
Foreign-trained workers now have the same right to have their credentials recognized in
other jurisdictions as those trained in Canada after their qualifications are initially recognized.
The LMCG has developed a detailed set of Guidelines (2003) for the Forum of Labour
Market Ministers (FLMM) that are being used to ensure that regulatory bodies come into
compliance with their obligations under Chapter 7.
The FLMM has also the  Work Destinations Website which provides much information
on regulated trades and professions in Canada.  This includes information on entry requirements,
for professional or trades people moving within Canada and for immigrants. While it is useful, it
does not contain all the information required by workers changing jurisdictions. And it does not
contain all the information available in existing MRAs. 
RESULTS OF THE 2004/05 SURVEY OF LABOUR MOBILITY IN CANADA
In the winter of 2004/05, the LMCG carried out a survey for the FLMM of provincial and
territorial regulatory authorities on compliance with the AIT and MRAs (FLMM, 2004).  Out of
425 regulatory bodies surveyed, 392 responded.
The total number of applicants received by these regulatory bodies over the year ending
September 30, 2004  was 12,953. Of these, 8,386 or 65 per cent were granted licensure,
registration or certification and 4,567 or 35 per cent were refused (FLMM, 2005,p.12). It is worth
noting that the total number of applicants only represented less than 5 per cent of total
interprovincial migrants during the period.  And those refused only represented 1.7 per cent of
interprovincial migrants or less than 0.03 per cent of the labour force. Even if it was assumed that
an equal number did not apply because of the expectation of rejection, the number affected would
still be very small.
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Of the total number of applicants received, 1,590 were foreign trained. Of these, 815 or
51 per cent were granted licensure, registration or certification (FLMM, 2005,p.13).
The survey concluded that there was a high level of recognition in 8 of the 50 occupations
surveyed that registered approval rates of 86 to 100 per cent. 23 occupations reported registration
rates of 59 to 85 per cent, and 18 occupations reported low registration rates of 4 to 50 per cent.
In the occupations with low rates, there were unusually high volumes of occupants in two
occupations and most applicants had not been licensed under the terms of a MRA  (FLMM,
2005,p.3). 
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Table 2
Status of Mutual Recognition Agreements as of January 2007
Occupations
All
signed
One or
two
have
not
signed
No
MRA Occupations
All
signed
One or
two
have
not
signed
No
MRA
Acupuncturists All Lawyers Most
Agrologists Most
Licensed Practical
Nurses Most
Architects Most Massage Therapist All
Audiologists & Speech
Pathologists Most
Medical Laboratory
Technologists Most
Certified General
Accountants All
Medical Radiation
Technicians All
Certified Management
Accountants Most Midwives Most
Chartered Accountants Most Naturopathic Physicians All
Chiropractors    Most
Occupational
Therapists All
Community Urban Planner X Opticians Most
Dental Assistants All Optometrists Most
Dental Hygienists Most Paramedics Most
Dental Specialist Most Pharmacists      Most
Dental
Technicians/Technologists Most Physicians Most
Dentists Most Physiotherapists Most
Denturists Most Podiatrists/Chiropodists X
Dieticians/Nutritionists Most Psychiatric Nurses All
Embalmers/Funeral
Directors Most Psychologists All
Engineering Technicians
and Technologists All Real Estate Agents Most
Engineers Most Registered Nurses Most
Foresters All Respiratory Therapists All
Geoscientists All Social W orkers X
Hearing Aid Practitioners    All Teachers Most
Home Economists All Translators All
Hunting Guides X Veterinarians Most
Land Surveyors Most
Total  (50
occupations) 16 30 4
Landscape Architects  Most      
Notes: Yukon and Nunavut did not take part in 2004/05 Survey
Public Accountants were not surveyed - No MRA in database
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The survey revealed that 76 per cent of regulators have compared their competency
profiles and occupational standards with other provinces as required under Section 708 of
Chapter 7 and that 71 per cent have found a high degree of commonality (FLMM, 2005, p.6).  It
also showed that 12 per cent of regulators  had not yet signed a MRA or similar protocol with
other jurisdictions and 6 per cent had not even developed one (FLMM, 2005, p.9).
In conclusion, this survey provides some very useful information and should be done
annually as part of a monitoring and evaluation framework for the AIT. That way it would be
possible to standardize the definitions used and treatment of responses in order to get more
meaningful results. A time series would also be helpful in tracking progress. There are questions
about the exact meaning of registration rates (and their converse refusal rates). The survey
correctly stresses the need for follow-up questions to explore the reason why workers are not
being registered when they change jurisdictions. It is not clear if the refusals are justified or not.
It would also be helpful to have some tracking over time to see if refusals really just mean delay
and not final rejection.
THE FUNCTIONING OF THE AIT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM 
Following the GATT and WTO Agreement, disputes under Chapter 7 of the AIT are
treated as bilateral disagreements over obligations under the Agreement. Consequently, they are
supposed to be resolved through consultation between the governments who signed the
agreement.  Only as a last resort, if consultations fail, is a panel of independent experts to be
selected by the parties to recommend a resolution to the disputants.. 
A party, meaning one of the governments involved,  initiates a complaint under the AIT
by requesting consultations with the respondent party on a practice that it alleges contravenes the
respondent's obligations under Chapter 7 of the AIT and impairs the AIT’s  benefits to the
complainant.  The complaint may be made on the party's own behalf or on behalf of a person it
represents. 
If bilateral consultations do not resolve the matter within 30 days or an agreed timeframe,
the complaining party may seek the assistance of the FLMM in resolving the matter.  The FLMM
may offer mediation or consultation, or advice and recommendations based on a set of
procedures it approved for handling disputes. 
 
If the FLMM's assistance fails to resolve the matter, the complainant may seek resolution
under the general dispute settlement procedures of the Agreement set out in Chapter 17.  This
also involves an initial bilateral consultation phase which, if unsuccessful, leads to a request to
the Committee on Internal Trade to establish a panel of independent persons chosen from a
standing roster, generally to determine whether the measure at issue is inconsistent with the
Agreement.
Once the panel issues its report, its recommendations are supposed to be implemented by
the parties to the dispute.  If the respondent does not implement the panel’s findings, the
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complainant may withdraw benefits of the Agreement that accrue to the respondent. But this has
never been done and is not a very credible penalty.
Despite being the "people" chapter of the AIT, Chapter 7 does not provide for direct
access by workers to its dispute settlement procedure. However, there is an alternative path to
resolve disputes arising under Chapter 7, which is available to persons.  It is to make use of the
general dispute settlement procedure under Chapter 17.
Under Chapter 17, a complaint by a person must first be presented to an independent
screener appointed by the person's home government.  If the case is approved by the screener,
then the complaining person can pursue it with the support of its government.  This involves
entering into consultations with the respondent party, and ultimately, if unsuccessful, requesting
the establishment of a panel whose findings are supposed to be binding on the parties.  
There have been 22 disputes under Chapter 7 since the AIT came into effect on July 1,
1995 (Table 3). These cases have involved: paramedics; hairstylists; practical nurses; hunting
guides; denturists; public accountants; construction workers; opticians; dental assistants;
embalmers; and emergency medical technicians.  Of the cases, 7 have been satisfactorily
resolved, 2 upheld, 1 denied, 2 withdrawn, 5 inactive, 4 active, and 1 not subject to the AIT. This
is not a very large number of disputes. It is also noteworthy that only around a third have been
successfully resolved. On the other hand, there have reportedly been a much larger number of
complaints that have been handled informally and never result in formal complaints.
The most interesting cases are the two that actually went to a panel and were upheld.
These involved complaints by the Certified General Accountants Association of Manitoba
against Ontario and the Certified General Accountants Association of New Brunswick against
Quebec regarding  restrictions preventing their members from auditing public companies. The
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada has thoroughly documented their
experience and frustrations in pursuing these complaints (2004, 2005, 2006).
 In December 1999  the Certified General Accountants Association of Manitoba initiated
a complaint against Ontario. The complaint took a long time to  work its way through the various
stages –  screener, consultations, panel.  Finally, over a year and a half later in October 2001 a
panel found that Ontario’s public accounting licensing system was inconsistent with AIT. But
then nothing happened for quite a while.  It was almost three years later when Ontario passed the
Public Accounting Act, 2004. This act, which was not implemented until November 2005,
established a Public Accounting Board that should eliminate restrictions on access to public
accounting for CGAs.
The complaint of the Certified General Accountants Association of New Brunswick
against Quebec has also moved slowly. It was initiated in March 2004.  In August 2005 a panel
found that Quebec’s measures restricting public accounting to CAs  was inconsistent with the
AIT. Quebec is reportedly still discussing how to resolve the issue with the three provincial
accounting bodies.
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In its study of the AIT dispute resolution system, the Certified General Accountants
Association of Canada has complained that the “system was not working as it should and is in
urgent need of improvement” (2006, p.4).  Its most fundamental criticisms are that:
1. The AIT is difficult to interpret and to access and the dispute resolution process is so
expensive to apply both in terms of time and money.
2. Governments are supposed to resolve disputes cooperatively through consultations but
these consultations are often expensive and delay the resolution of disputes and are not
accessible to people affected by the trade restrictions.
3. There is no certainty that governments will implement panel findings and there is no
mechanism in the AIT to ensure that they do.
The Certified General Accountants Association of Canada has also made a number of
specific recommendations for improving the process that merit consideration.
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Table 3
Status of Disputes under AIT Chapter 7 on Labour Mobility 
File Number Originating Issue Complainant Respondent Stage Disposition" Disposition Type of 
Date Date Complaint"" 
05106-7 NL Oct-05 Paramedic Licensing NL AB Ch 7 Consults Active NA G-G(P) 
05106-7 FED Apr-05 Federal Hiring Practices AB, BC CA CH 7 Consults Active NA G-G 
04105-7 MB Nov-04 Hairstylist Licensing MB NS Ch 7 Consults Active NA G-G(P) 
04105-7 LPN Sep-04 Practical Nurse Licensing NL ON CH 7 Consults Active NA G-G(P) 
03104-7 HUN Nov-03 Hunting Guide licensing NB NL CH 7 Consults Resolved Jan-05 G-G(P) 
03104-7 DEN Apr-03 Denturist Licensing QC ON CH 7 Consults Resolved Jun-03 G-G(P) 
02103-7 CGA Jul~02 Public Accounting CGA Association of NB QC Panel Upheld Aug-05 P-G 
01102-7
ADAT 
Feb-02 Construction Worker Mobility Canada [ADAT] QC, ON 1711(1) request Inactive NA G-G(P) 
99100-7 KEN Mar-00 Hunting Guide Licensing NS NL Ch 7 Consults Resolved Jan-05 G-G(P) 
99100-7 KEN Mar-00 Hunting Guide Licensing NS NB Ch 7 Consults Resolved Jun-03 G-G(P) 
99/00-7 CGA Dec-99 Public Accounting CGA Association of MB ON Panel Upheld Oct-03 P-G 
98/99-7 COL Jan-99 Opticians Registration Criteria AB BC Ch 7 Consults Inactive NA G-G(P) 
98/99-7 CGA May-98 Public Accounting SK Professional Association ON Ch 7 Consults Inactive NA G-G(P) 
96/97-7 NL Feb-97 Denturists Licensing NS NL Ch 7 Assistance Resolved Sep-98 G-G(P) 
96/97-7 BUL Sep-96 Dental Assistant licensing AB MB Ch 7 Assistance Inactive NA G-G(P) 
96/97-7 GIM Jul-96 Medical Services Residency Requirements AB SK Screener Denied Nov-96 P-G 
96/97-7 May-96 Embalmer Licensing AB SK Ch 7 Consults Withdrawn May-96 G-G(P) 
95/96-7 ONT Mar-96 Insured Medical Services Restrictions AB ON Ch 7 Consults Withdrawn Apr-96 G-G(P) 
95/96-7 AB Oct-95 Municipal Fee Differentials BC AB Ch 7 Consults Not Subj. to Oct-95 G-G 
95/96-7 TAY Sep-95 Chartered Accountant Licensing ON SK 1711(1) Inactive NA G-G(P) 
95/96-7 ONT Sep-95 Emergency Medical Technicians Licensing AB ON Ch 7 Consults Resolved Mar-97 G-G(P) 
95/96-7 VAN Jul-95 Residency Requirements AB BC Ch 7 Consults Resolved Jul-95 G-G 
Definitions of Disposition  
Upheld A Chapter 17 dispute panel found in favour of the complainant. 
Denied A Chapter 17 dispute panel found against the complainant or a Chapter 17 screener denied the complainant's request to proceed with a dispute under Chapter 17 
Resolved The disputants reached a mutually satisfactory resolution of the complaint at any stage in the dispute resolution process. 
Not subject to A screener decided that the complaint does not fall within the scope of the AIT or the disputants have mutually agreed that the complaint does not fall within the scope of the AlT.
Withdrawn The complainant withdrew the complaint. 
Active The disputants are actively pursuing the resolution of the complaint. 
Inactive The disputants are not actively pursuing the resolution of the complaint. 
Type of Complaint
G-G Government to Government 
P-G Person to Government 
G-G(P) Government to Government on behalf of a Person 
Source: Agreement on Internal Trade, November 2006.  http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/dispute.htm
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THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY REGARDING LABOUR MOBILITY UNDER THE
AIT
When the Council of the Federation was created by provincial and territorial premiers in
December 2003, one of the two priorities it set out to achieve was: “strengthening the economic
union, including enhancing internal trade, improving labour mobility, and harmonizing and
streamlining regulation.”  The work program it established and the high priority it attached to this
objective have resulted in a renewed effort to make the AIT work and to reduce interprovincial
barriers. The first workplan was presented at the COF’s meeting in February 2004. A progress
report was prepared in January 2006  (Council of Federation, 2006). 
Over the course of 2006, the Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement between
British Columbia and Alberta and the Ontario-Quebec Agreement on Construction provided
concrete examples of progress in removing interprovincial barriers and created further interest in
improving the AIT.
The lead jurisdiction for labour mobility issues was Ontario. The progress report noted
that the FLMM had prepared an assessment of Chapter 7 of the AIT, including conducting a
survey of regulatory bodies, and has concluded that “further efforts are necessary to secure
greater cooperation by regulatory bodies with the obligations of the AIT.  It also revealed that,
after considering the assessment at their June 2005 meeting,  the Committee on Internal Trade
stressed the importance of addressing the issues of foreign credentials recognition and
interprovincial labour mobility.  Ontario consequently contacted the FLMM and requested that it 
prepare an action plan with specific targets and timelines.
On behalf of the COF, Premier Gary Doer of Manitoba attended the September 7, 2006
meeting of the CIT. With respect to labour mobility, he reported in a letter (Council of
Federation, 2006b)  to Premier Danny Williams of Newfoundland, the chair of the COF, that
ministers had “agreed to establish a new deadline of April 1, 2009 for all existing regulated
occupations to establish compliance with the labour mobility provisions of the Agreement on
Internal Trade.” This is intended to allow Canadians “to work anywhere in Canada without
restrictions” and to build on “a process of mutual recognition among provinces and territories for
professionals with foreign credentials.” He also reported that there was agreement that “an
effective, fair, efficient, accountable and enforceable administrative dispute mechanism” should
be implemented by September 2007.  This is very important for resolving disputes over the
recognition of occupational credentials. If events unfold as planned, there will definitely be major
improvements in the functioning of the AIT with respect to removing barriers to labour mobility.
LABOUR MOBILITY UNDER THE TILMA COMPARED TO THE AIT
The TILMA was established pursuant to Article 1800 (Trade Enhancement
Arrangements) of the AIT, which permits further liberalization agreements among the parties.  It
is much more ambitious than the AIT. The TILMA is based on a principle that the BC and
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Alberta governments are resolved to “establish a comprehensive agreement on trade, investment
and labour mobility that applies to all sectors of the economy and to “eliminate barriers that
restrict or impair trade, investment or labour mobility” (TILMA, Part I),  whereas the AIT only
commits parties to “not establish new barriers to internal trade” and to “facilitate the cross-
boundary movement of persons,  goods, services, and investment within Canada” (AIT, Article
101, 3(a)).
The TILMA sets out general rules of “no obstacles” (Article 3)  and “non-discrimination”
(Article 4). The AIT is made up of specific obligations set out in the agreement. The general rule
for the TILMA is that everything is covered by the agreement unless it is specified to be out. For
the AIT it is the opposite.
With respect to labour mobility, the TILMA seeks to facilitate movement between British
Columbia and Alberta by reciprocal recognition of occupational certifications of workers.  The
TILMA’s  ultimate objective is to allow  workers who are certified in one province to be
recognized as qualified in the other. This means that workers in all regulated occupations would
be able to move to the other province and, after registering with the appropriate regulatory
authority, practice their occupations without having to undergo “material additional training or
examinations.”  This is interpreted to mean that a jurisprudence exam on provincial regulations
that are specific and different in each jurisdiction would be allowed, provided that it was not so
substantive as to be “material.”  An example of an occupation with a different scope of practice
in the two jurisdictions that may need some additional training is land agent.  In Alberta, land
agents are responsible for negotiating oil and gas rights agreements with private landowners,
whereas in B.C. the oil and gas is likely to be on crown land.  The labour mobility provisions 
also applies to internationally-trained workers who once certified in one of the jurisdictions
would be automatically qualified in the other.
Workers in some occupations, such as the trades covered by the Red Seal program, will
be able to take advantage of this benefit immediately, but most workers, who are in the more than
60 occupations listed  in the transitional section of the agreement, will have to wait.  There is a 
two-year transitional period specified in the agreement, which ends April 1, 2009.  During that
time, the two provinces will be working hard  to reconcile their regulations as the Premiers are
committed to meeting the deadline.  However, if agreement is not reached, then the listed
occupational-related measures will still be permitted.  To a certain extent, this is what already
was and is being done under the AIT with even the same deadline. 
The list of occupational measures is not even as constraining as it looks. It can even be
increased where: “the measure is necessary to achieve a legitimate objective”; “regulates an
occupation not regulated by the other Party”: or “relates to a difference between the Parties in the
permitted scope of the occupation” (TILMA, Section 13. 5).
There is some concern that the political pressure for mutual recognition could lead to a
“race to the bottom.” However, if one or the other of the provincial governments had serious
concerns that this was indeed happening,  then mutual recognition could be denied pending
agreement on standards.
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The dispute resolution mechanism in the TILMA is stronger and simpler than that in the
AIT, which is set out in Chapter 17 as well as Chapter 7 of the agreement.  TILMA’s mechanism 
is also open to individuals as well as governments with a less cumbersome procedure than that in
the AIT involving a screener.  And it promises to be more effective because in addition to
requiring consultations it offers recourse to binding arbitral panels.  If there is any question about
the implementation of the panel’s final report after the specified reasonable period of time of up
to a year has passed, another panel can be convened to determine if there is compliance and to
determine monetary awards up to $5 million.  This panel’s decision can be subject to judicial
review and enforcement under the Arbitration Act.  In contrast, under the AIT there is no
consequence if the governments choose to ignore their obligations and panel findings as
happened in the AIT’s two public accounting cases. 
The TILMA dispute resolution mechanism is definitely a model that should be seriously
considered as the CIT considers way to meet its commitment of  implementing  “an effective,
fair, efficient, accountable and enforceable administrative dispute mechanism” by September
2007. 
Conference Board of Canada (2005) carried out an impact assessment study of the
TILMA for the BC Ministry of Economic Development. While the study discusses the labour
mobility sections of the agreement and compares them with the AIT, it does not offer any
separate estimate of the impact of the labour mobility provisions of the TILMA. Instead, its
estimate focuses on the overall impact of the agreement on British Columbia industries, using a
somewhat questionable and highly subjective approach based on a survey of an extremely small
sample of ministries and industrial groups.
THE ONTARIO-QUEBEC AGREEMENT ON CONSTRUCTION 
Ontario and Quebec have had a longstanding dispute over construction employment. This
stems from the highly regulated nature of the Quebec construction sector under the Commission
de la construction du Québec and the Régie du bâtiment du Québec.  The Quebec construction
sector is subject to many complicated rules and restrictions for bidding on contracts and working
on projects. Under Quebec law, construction workers must belong to a union and hold the
required competency certificate.  In addition, there are rules on where in particular a worker can
work in the province.
The Quebec regulatory regime for construction made it extremely difficult for Ontario
contractors and construction workers to work in Quebec. This caused growing dissatisfaction in
the Ontario construction industry, particularly in the regions bordering Quebec. The heated 
nature of this dispute made it very political.  It was consequently pursued outside of the
framework of the AIT, which can be interpreted as a statement about the inadequacy of the AIT
dispute resolution mechanism.
The most recent round of the dispute was concluded in June 2006 when the Premiers of
Ontario and Quebec signed an “Agreement on Labour Mobility and  Recognition of
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Qualifications, Skills and Work Experience in the Construction Industry.” This ended restrictions
on Quebec contractors and construction workers imposed under the “Fairness Is A Two-Way
Street Act (Construction Labour Mobility), 1999.”  This act, which Quebec tried unsuccessfully
to challenge under the AIT’s DSM but which Ontario had refused to allow, had established a
Jobs Protection Office. It also had  barred Quebec contractors from bidding on more than $100
billion in construction projects funded by the Ontario government and imposed registration
requirements on Quebec contractors and workers that were similar to those imposed on Ontario
contractors and workers seeking to work in Quebec.
Under the 2006 agreement, Ontario residents will gain better access to construction
contracts and jobs in Québec, including some Québec Crown corporation contracts.  And
Québeckers will no longer have their access to construction contracts and jobs in Ontario
restricted.  Both provinces' contractors will also be granted reciprocal access to construction
contracts of provincial electrical utilities. The agreement provides specific procedures for the
mutual recognition of the qualifications, skills, experience and occupational health and safety
training of construction workers.
From Ontario’s point of view, there are three particular new arrangements that addressed
their concerns about Quebec construction industry regulations. The first is the “trade activity
card.” This would allow an Ontario tradesmen in a voluntary trade to go to Quebec with an
Ontario contractor, get a CCQ union card and legally work in a regulated trade. The second is
streamlined procedures for Ontario contractors who wish to work in Quebec to get licensed as
general or specialized contractors with the Régie du bâtiment du Québec.  The third is a
“specialized work card.” It would permit an Ontario manufacturer of specialized construction
goods with warranties like cupboards or windows to bring their trained workers to Quebec to
install their products. Ontario Jobs Protection Office continues to function to monitor the
agreement and to exercise responsibility for registering Quebec workers and investigating reports
of harassment.
Quebec will probably be the biggest beneficiary of the agreement because it was
reportedly losing over a couple billion dollars in construction contracts each year in Ontario as a
result of the restrictions imposed in the “Fairness Is A Two-Way Street Act.” Over ten thousand
Quebec construction workers are expected to work in Ontario, whereas only a few hundred
Ontario workers are expected to work in Quebec.  On the other hand, Ontario will significantly
benefit from the opening up of the complicated system of access to Hydro-Québec contracts. This
is likely to be especially important with such large projects in the offing as Hydro-Québec’s $5-
billion Eastmain-1A – Rupert project at James Bay.
A study on the economic impact of the agreement of the Ontario Quebec construction
agreement would be interesting.
New Brunswick, which had similar grievances to Ontario, is in the process of trying to
negotiate a similar construction agreement with Quebec.
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APPROACHES TO BARRIERS TO LABOUR MOBILITY IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
The United States
There are no specific mobility rights granted by the United States Constitution although
the Fifteenth Amendment guarantees due process and the equal protection of the laws in dealing
with professional and occupational regulatory bodies.
The U.S system of professional licensing and certification like that in Canada grew out of
the common law where guilds managed to establish statutory monopolies for certain trades.  Its
rationale is to protect public health and safety and to ensure the quality of professional services.
The states are the level of  government responsible for licensing and certification. As a general
rule, they delegate their legal authority to institutions. The exact nature of these institutions
differs across states.  There are differences in the degree of autonomy, the selection of members,
its share of professional and of  public or lay members, and standards for disciplinary procedures. 
The boards can also be self-funded through fees, or be funded directly by the state legislature .
Shirley Svorny (1999) 
The extent of the professional regulation is if anything even greater than in Canada if the
State of California is indicative of the degree of regulation. Its Department of Consumer Affairs,
which sets minimum standards for competence education and skills in such areas as healthcare,
cosmetology, contracting and automobile repair, is a bureaucratic giant made up of more than 40
boards, bureaus and other agencies that regulates more than 2.4 million professionals in 255
occupations. (Department of Consumer Affairs in California, 2005, p.4)
Professionals moving from one state to another have to obtain a new state license or
certification. This is facilitated by reciprocity agreements under which board in two or more
states agree to grant a license to a anyone already licensed in the other.  This means that it accepts
the license of the other state as a valid basis for licensure, and dispenses with licensing exams
and other conditions of entry.  It is, in effect, another name for a Mutual Recognition Agreement
as in Canada.  But as in Canada licensing boards can still put impediments in the way of full
reciprocity. The ease of securing a license thus can depend very much on the particular
profession and the particular jurisdiction (See Stanley J, Gross,1986 for survey of studies of the
effect of professional licensing arrangements on labour mobility ).  An area where there is very
good mobility is for health practitioners where there has been to move from state-specific to
standardized exams (Shirley Svorny, 1999, p.313) .
In the United States, there is nothing like the Agreement on Internal Trade and the related
institutions governing relations among the states on professional licensing.  The closest thing is
Council of State Governments, which is an organization of the state governments that advocates
“multi-state problem solving and partnerships.”  From time to time, it carries out studies that
touch on issues related to professional licensing and labour mobility such as its recent study on
teachers.  It also annually puts out Suggested State Legislation which allows states to benefit
from legislation in other states, including professional licensing legislation. But at the same time,
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it stresses that it is not seeking to influence the “enactment of state legislation.”
While the situation obviously depends on the particular profession or occupation and state
or province, the system of professional licensing in the United States does not, at first glance,
appear to involve smaller barriers to labour mobility than that in Canada. Since this seems to fly
in the face of the conventional wisdom, perhaps a more detailed comparison of the extent of the
barriers under the two systems is in order.
The European Union
Free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom under law in the European Union
and an essential element of European citizenship. Under Article 39 EC and Regulation 1612/68
on freedom of movement of workers within the Community, nationals of EU Member States
have the right to work in other Member States. 
The European Court of Justice has interpreted Article 39  to mean that migrants must be
treated the same as nationals in terms of their access to employment, working conditions, and tax
and social advantages. However, according to Article 39 (4) free movement of workers does not
apply to the public sector. While this derogation has been strictly interpreted by the Court of
Justice,  Member States can restrict public sector posts to their nationals “if they involve the
exercise of public authority and the responsibility for safeguarding the general interests of the
state.” Consequently, nationality and language requirements are permissible in certain
circumstances. However, posts involving administrative tasks, technical consultation and
maintenance can not be restricted to nationals of the host Member States.  But those wishing to
work in the public sector may also encounter difficulties  with respect to the recognition of
professional credentials and experience and seniority acquired in another Member State and with
recruitment procedures. Nevertheless, following the Court of Justice’s case law, previous periods
of employment in another Member State must be taken into account into determining salary and
seniority   (European Public Administration Network, 2006). The public sector is an area where
there is much greater labour mobility in Canada than in the European Union.
The EU has a system in place to assist the movement of people in specific professions or
occupations who must have their diplomas and professional qualifications recognized to practise
(European Union, 2007).  Sectoral Directives providing for the automatic recognition of
diplomas have been adopted for some professions such as architects, midwives, pharmacists,
doctors, nurses, dentists and veterinary surgeons. For other regulated professions, professional
qualifications are recognized in accordance with two general Directives (89/48/EEC and
92/51/EEC), as amended by Directive 2001/19/EC.
The General System provides for the recognition of professional qualifications. Its
purpose is to allow individuals with professional qualifications from one Member State to
practice their profession in another Member State where the profession is regulated.
For professions, including those where individuals carry out a commercial or craft activity
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or provide a service covered by Directive 1999/42/EC, as well as lawyers, teachers, chartered
accountants, physiotherapists, the rules are straightforward.  If the profession is not regulated in
the State of provenance, the competent professional authority may require that the applicant have
two years’ professional experience. On the other hand, if the individual's qualification relate to
regulated training, this professional experience will not be required. 
The General system for professional recognition considers certificates, diplomas, titles or
qualifications based on completing specific vocational training.  As a general rule, diplomas,
certificates or other qualifications are recognized at face value.
Diplomas are not automatically recognized at the European level. Individuals must apply
for recognition from the competent authority in the host country. That authority will examine the
case individually to make sure: that the regulated profession is the same as that for which the
individual is fully qualified; and that the duration and content of the training does not differ
substantially. If the professions are the same, and the training similar, the competent authority
must recognize the individual’s qualifications. And as long as these conditions are satisfied, even
if there are differences between the professions or in the duration or content of the training, the
individual’s application can not be rejected outright, but the individual can be required to take
compensatory measures. Only in an extreme case can the authority refuse an application.
There is a four-month deadline for the competent authority to process an application and
make a decision. If the application is rejected or compensatory measures are required, the
individual is eligible to appeal to the national authorities. The European Court of Justice can be
asked to determine if a State is in breach of its obligations, as a result of incorrectly applying
Community law or having incompatible national legislation. But the national authorities still
have the responsibility to amend individual decisions to comply with Community law.
There are several compensatory measures that may be required by competent national
authorities. One is  the acquisition of additional professional experience of between one and four
years if there is a difference of at least one year in the duration of training. Another is a period of
adaptation or aptitude test if there are substantial differences between the professions or in the
content of the training.
There are special procedures for craft and commercial professions and for the services
covered by Directive 1999/42/EC. Member States must accept previous exercise of the activity
for a specified  period of time in another Member State as evidence of the required knowledge
and aptitude.  Individuals who do not meet these conditions may apply for recognition of their
diplomas, certificates and other qualifications in accordance with the General System.
There is also a system of automatic recognition based on diplomas from Member States
for certain professions.
There are seven regulated professions that are covered by sectoral Directives: doctors
(general practitioner or specialist); general nurses; midwives; veterinary surgeons; dental
surgeons; pharmacists; and architects.
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If training or education for professions or occupations is obtained outside of the European
Union, there is more discretion involved in approving qualification. A Member State can
recognize the qualification based on certain agreed criteria provided that the Community
minimum training requirements have been met. There is a similar deadline for decision and
appeal procedure. Again the European Court of Justice can only make decisions on whether a
State is in breach of its obligations in applying Community law and the specific decisions on
qualifications must be made by competent national authorities.
The European Union’s system for recognizing professional qualifications is, like
Canada’s, based on Mutual Recognition. Also individuals are required to satisfy the requirements
of individual jurisdictions and there is no binding EU-wide dispute settlement mechanisms that is
available to individuals.  It thus does not appear to allow a greater degree of labour mobility for
regulated professions and occupations  than in Canada.
In fact, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
(2005, p.11) cites research showing that “geographic mobility is not a very widespread
phenomena in Europe and mobility between various EU Member States is of a (very) limited
nature.”  It attributes this to “a number of factors: there are clear institutional and legal
differences between Member States; moreover, the decision to move is affected by cultural
barriers (such as language and customs) and by the social costs of leaving one’s networks (family
friends and colleagues) as well as being influenced by the life course stage a person occupies.” In
addition, labour markets are more highly regulated in Europe than in Canada (Harris and Schmitt,
2001, pp.39-40). 
In spite of efforts to harmonize, social and health programs are not as integrated as in
Canada. There is nothing as comprehensive and portable as the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan,
Old Age Security and medicare and hospital insurance under the Canada Health Act. And the
personal income tax is not integrated as under the Tax Collection Agreements. Consequently,
barriers to labour mobility from government spending programs and taxation are probably much
greater in Europe than in Canada.
 
Given that some prominent Canadians have claimed that barriers to labour mobility are
greater in Canada than in Europe, perhaps it would be worthwhile to test the validity of this
prima facie implausible view by carrying out a more detailed study comparing professional and
occupational recognition and labour mobility in Canada and the EU.
Australia and New Zealand
Labour mobility for regulated professions and occupations in Australia is established by
the Australian Mutual Recognition Act (1992), which also applies to goods as well as
occupations.  As it affects occupations, this act allows a person who is registered to practice an
occupation in one Australian state and who moves to another state to practice an equivalent
occupation.
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The mutual recognition principle states that a person who is registered in one state for an
occupation is entitled, after notifying the local registration authority of another state for the
equivalent occupation, to be registered, and, pending the completion of the registration, to be
allowed actually to work in the occupation. This means that the person’s registration must be
accepted without having to satisfy the requirements of the new jurisdiction with regard to
qualifications and experience.
This principle does not apply when the state to which the person moves has a law  that
relates specifically to the manner of carrying on an occupation.  An example of this exception to
the MRA is the remote provision of a service where the service provider lives in another
jurisdiction.
The mutual recognition act provides a review mechanism to appeal a decision made by a
regulatory body.  If a person's application for registration in an occupation in another state is
refused, application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the
decision.
More recently, the Australian Mutual Recognition Act served as the basis for the Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Agreement of 1997. The TTMRA  was considered to be a logical
extension of the 1983 Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relationship Trade Agreement.
The Australian Mutual Recognition Act and the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition
Agreement provide for more automatic recognition of professional and occupational credentials
than the AIT. Decisions of local registration authorities can be appealed to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal in Australia or the Trans-Tasman Occupational Tribunal in New Zealand,
which was established as a result of the TTMRA.  The two tribunals are required to cooperate
and were required to enter into a memorandum of understanding to that effect. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, one or the other of the two tribunals can make an order that
an appellant is entitled to be registered or specify or describe necessary conditions for
occupational equivalence. A tribunal can also decide to make a declaration that the two
occupations are not equivalent only if the activities are not substantially the same or if
registration could result in a threat to occupational health or safety or threaten significant
environmental pollution. Declarations of non-equivalence stand for a period of twelve months
during which time the declaration must be referred to the Ministerial Council in the relevant
jurisdiction to determine whether agreed standards, including competency standards, should be
applied to the occupation in question. Parties can also independently refer competency standards
to the Ministerial Council for determination. Ministers from New Zealand and at least one
participating Australian party can declare occupations equivalent in their jurisdictions.
In a comprehensive study of MRAs and the TTMRA, the Australian Productivity
Commission (2003, p.40) found that “mutual recognition appears to be associated with a modest
increase in interstate arrivals in registered occupations compared with the other occupations”
While not exactly a ringing endorsement, this at least offers some encouragement that MRAs are
working in Australia and New Zealand to facilitate labour mobility.
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The system in Australia and New Zealand puts much more emphasis on requiring mutual
recognition than the AIT does in Canada. It also has a dispute settlement mechanism that is much
more open to persons encountering difficulties getting their professional qualifications
recognized in other jurisdictions and that once invoked produces definitive results within a
reasonable period of time.
COMPARISONS OF LABOUR MOBILITY IN CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES
Making reliable comparisons of barriers to labour mobility across countries or economic
unions is very difficult. In addition, to the barriers in regulated professions and occupations in
sub-national jurisdictions, there can be other barriers like social insurance, pensions, health
insurance, language and culture that inhibit labour mobility (Gunderson, 1994). This makes it
almost impossible to disentangle the impact of the various factors affecting labour mobility.
IMF Staff members Tamim Bayoumi, Bennett Sutton, and Andrew Swiston (2006)
analyzed “the flexibility of the Canadian labour market across provinces in both an inter- and
intra-national context using macroeconomic data on employment, unemployment, participation,
and (for Canada) migration and real wages.”  Using a VAR model for a vector including changes
in employment, employment rates and participation rates, they found that “Canadian labour
markets respond “in a similar manner to their U.S. counterparts, and are more flexible than those
in major European countries.”  This conclusion is based on the response of the model to an
employment shock. In both Canada and the United States, the initial employment shock is
followed by a further increase in employment as population expands, whereas in Europe (Spain,
France and Germany being the specific countries considered) the initial employment increase is
lost as population fails to expand (Bayoumi, Sutton, and Swiston. 2006, p.7).
Bayoumi, Sutton, and Swiston also analyzed the functioning of the labour market across
different Canadian regions. Their conclusion was that labour markets in Canada were more
flexible in the West and that migration played a larger role in labour market adjustment in the
Western provinces than in the Atlantic. And that Ontario had a more flexible labour market than
Quebec (Bayoumi, Sutton, and Swiston. 2006, p.7). 
In a background study prepared for its 2005 Article IV consultations, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF, 2005, pp.92-100) concluded that “Canada is characterized by a relatively
high degree of flexibility, of a magnitude comparable if not larger than many other industrialized
countries, with the likely exception of the United States.”  This conclusion was supported by a
thorough  analysis of different indicators of economic flexibility that included: the reallocation of
production resources across sectors;  rates of firm turnover, and of job creation and destruction
across countries; and the estimated coefficients of Phillip’s curve wage equations. It suggests that
interprovincial barriers to labour mobility have not undermined the flexibility of Canadian labour
markets.
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BRIEF SURVEY OF THE RESEARCH ON INTERPROVINCIAL LABOUR MOBILITY
AND THE ECONOMIC COST OF BARRIERS
Some Studies on Canadian Interprovincial Labour Mobility
There have been a few studies in recent years that have examined interprovincial labour
mobility. While none of them specifically considered the impact of regulatory barriers such as
licensing and certification on labour mobility, they are worth looking at for the light they shed on
interprovincial labour mobility more generally.
The first study to be considered is by Zhengxi Lin (1995). He  used data from the Labour
Market Activity Survey for 1988-90 to explore interprovincial migration, and  found that
Unemployment Insurance and social assistance had no impact. Barriers resulting from
professional and occupational regulations were not considered sufficiently important to warrant
inclusion as separate variables in his study.
Ross Finnie (2000) of Statistics Canada estimated the probability of moving from one
year to the next using panel logit models and data from the Longitudinal Administrative Database
(LAD) covering the period 1982 to 1995.  He made separate estimates for 8 age and sex groups.
And he used  environmental factors, personal characteristics, labour market attributes, and year
variables as explanatory variables and succeeded in estimating the impacts of these various
factors.  From an economic point of view, the most interesting findings were that migration was
positively, but weakly, related to earnings for prime age men and directly related to
unemployment rates.
Another study that sheds more light on the economic impact of mobility is Finnie (2001).
It investigated the effects of inter-provincial migration on individuals’ earnings using the LAD.
He found that inter-provincial mobility is associated with statistically significant and in many
cases quantitatively substantial changes in individuals’ earnings, with these effects varying by
age, sex, and province of origin. He also analyzed pre- and post-move earnings profiles, which
indicated that movers are quickly integrated into the destination labour markets. 
Using data from successive waves of the Survey of Labour Income and Dynamics (SLID)
over the 1993 to 1999 period, Rick Audus and James Ted McDonald (2003) estimate the
determinants of geographic mobility focusing on the possible impact of the Employment
Insurance (EI) Program. While they found no strong evidence of a direct relationship between EI and
geographic mobility, they did find some evidence of an indirect relationship for certain workers
with a weaker attachment to work. Barriers resulting from professional and occupational
regulations also were not incorporated in the analysis.
Kathleen Day and Stanley Winer (2005) studied the determinants of interprovincial
labour mobility over the 1974 to 1996 period using aggregate migration data constructed from
personal income tax files. They concluded that its prime determinants were differences in
earnings, employment prospects and moving costs and that the impact of public policies such as
unemployment insurance, taxation, social assistance and federal and provincial spending was
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small. The only policy changes that seemed to have a major impact on interprovincial labour
mobility was the election of the PQ government in 1976 and the closing of the cod fishery in
1992. While the analysis only covered the first two years that the AIT was in effect, it is still
interesting to note that no mention is made in the study of any impact of barriers resulting from
provincial professional and occupational regulations.
Focusing more narrowly on its own area of responsibility, the Construction Sector
Council (2005) commissioned Ray Pennings of WRF Services Inc. to carry out a study of worker
mobility in the large industrial and civil engineering sections of the construction industry. The
study involved two approaches: an on-site survey of workers by questionnaire; and focus groups
on site to confirm the findings and elicit some revealing anecdotes.  The survey yielded 875
completed questionnaires from three tar sands sites in Alberta and one power generation site in
New Brunswick.  It provided a profile of workers in the heavy construction industry and their
motivations for moving to major work sites. It also provided information on barriers to labour
mobility. The workers surveyed were from three groups: traditional building trades; an alternate
Christian union; and non-union workers. The most important finding of this study for the issue at
hand is that “no significant barriers to work resulting from certification, transferring pension and
benefits, and the travel card were found” (Construction Sector Council, 2005,pp.7&14).  This
result should not be surprising given the success of the Red Seal program and the tightness of the
Alberta labour market.  
No empirical studies were found that demonstrate that professional and occupational
regulations constitute a substantial barrier to labour mobility. This suggests that either the
barriers are not that important in practice or that for some unexplainable reason they have been
overlooked by researchers.
The Economic Cost of Barriers to Labour Mobility
A view that there are very large costs associated with non-recognition of credentials has
gained a certain currency in political and business circles . This view was fueled by an oft-quoted
Conference Board of Canada study entitled The Brain Gain: The Economic Benefits of
Recognizing Learning and Learning Credentials in Canada. It estimated that the cost of not
recognizing, mainly foreign, credentials was costing Canada’s economy $5 billion a year.
According to the study, more than 540,000 people would gain an average of $8,000 to $12,000
each year if their credentials were recognized. This  gap was estimated econometrically based on
the earnings of Canadians with equivalent education. A problem with this methodology is that it
assumes that the foreign and Canadian education are of equivalent value.  This is an assumption
that has been called into question by the results of  the International Adult Literacy Survey
(Bonikowska, Green and Riddell, 2006). For the most part, the differences in employment and
income for those with foreign and with domestic credentials reflect the valuations of employers.
Only a relatively small portion of those with foreign credentials are in professions where
licensing and certification is a barrier.
Aside from the Conference Board study, which really did not address the issue of
interprovincial barriers to labour mobility, only one study was found that attempted to quantify
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the economic costs of these barriers.  It was that done by Sunder Magun, Laval Lavallée,
Jean-Louis Arcand and François Ethier (1994) for Industry Canada. This paper, which predates
the AIT and is now very dated, uses two different, and very complicated, approaches and data
sets to estimate the gains and losses in economic welfare that would result from removing
interprovincial labour mobility barriers.  While it is not useful to spend a lot of time on a detailed
discussion of methodology, it is helpful to describe briefly the two approaches.   The first is
based on the assumption of wage convergence after the removal of barriers. The second estimates
an employment probability model and uses it to simulate the effect of eliminating barriers on
individuals’ probability of employment. The estimated Canada-wide effects using both
approaches on employment and output are so small as to be negligible (even though the
provincial effects are more significant). This reflects the small number of workers affected by the
barriers even before the AIT came into effect. However, as both approaches yield Canada-wide
declines in output and employment, except when using the wage convergence approach and
assuming a productivity increase, the estimates are counter intuitive. They, in effect, show a net,
albeit insignificant,  benefit from retaining the barriers.
In contrast, a more traditional, and less complicated, cost-benefit analysis based on the
assumption of full employment would estimate the increase in Canada-wide output and wages by
tallying the differences in the marginal productivity of labour and the wage rate between the
migrants’ origin and destination provinces for all the workers that move.  Such an analysis would
reveal a net benefit to be gained from eliminating the barriers as long as the wages and
productivity are higher in the destination provinces and workers move.  However, the net benefit 
would still be very small because of the number of workers moving affected by occupational
barriers is very small.  As noted above, those who were refused licensure, registration, or
certification, according to the FLMM survey, only represented 1.7 per cent of interprovincial
migrants or less than 0.03 per cent of the labour force. With such a minuscule number of workers
affected and with the potential wage increase only being a fraction of the overall wage, it should
not be surprising that any credible estimates of the economic cost of barriers to labour mobility
are likely to be minuscule.
It should not be necessary to produce exaggerated estimates of the costs of labour
mobility barriers to justify their removal. The mobility rights conferred on individuals under
section 6 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms should be sufficient justification for eliminating
the remaining barriers to labour mobility in Canada.
CONCEPTUAL, METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA ISSUES
The issues are straightforward. There are people who want to move to pursue economic
opportunities. Most are able to do so, but are hampered by interprovincial barriers. Questions
pertain to: the number of people that move or want to move; the impact of the move on their
labour market performance and income; the number who face barriers; and the number who
overcome barriers.
There are several data sources that to a greater or lesser extent can be used to shed light
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on these issues. The most promising include; the Census; the Longitudinal Administrative
Database; the EI File; the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics; special one-off surveys.
The Census provides the most comprehensive information on Canadians. This makes it
useful for providing information on the numbers and locations of those in particular trades or
occupations and their earnings. It can be used to analyze the earnings gaps for occupations in
different jurisdictions and to identify occupations where regulatory barriers may be significant.
But the fact that it is only available at five year intervals and is not longitudinal makes it less
useful for tracking interprovincial labour mobility and related analysis. 
The LAD is a 20 per cent longitudinal file constructed from the T1 tax returns filed
annually by Canadian taxpayers. Its advantage is its large size, longitudinal nature, annual
frequency, and comprehensive coverage of earnings. Its disadvantages are its rudimentary place
identification, lack of information on specific jobs, relative lack of occupational identifiers as
well as its confidential nature. Statistics Canada staff is very experienced in using this file and
has used in the past for studies of labour mobility.
The EI file has information from the Record of Employment that make it more useful in
tracking labour mobility and earnings in different jobs. A major drawback of the EI file is its
complexity and confidential nature.
The Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics SLID is a household survey that provides
national data on the fluctuations in income that a typical family or individual experiences over
time and that includes data collected by the Labour Force Survey (LFS).  The SLID sample is
composed of two panels, which each consist of two LFS rotation groups and include roughly
15,000 households. The  panels are surveyed for six consecutive years with a new overlapping
panel introduced every three years. The SLID has been used to analyze interprovincial labour
mobility. Its advantage is its longitudinal nature and its combination of labour market and income
variables. Its disadvantage is the small size of the sample for examining the interprovincial
mobility in regulated occupations.
While no data source is perfect for the task, the Census, the LAD, the EI file, the SLID all
can be used by skilled researchers to shed light on the issue of the impact of barriers to labour
mobility.
Special surveys can also be used to supplement existing data sources.  An example is the
2004/05 survey of labour mobility in Canada that was discussed above (FLMM, 2004). It was
directed at regulatory authorities and provided invaluable information on the functioning of the
mutual recognition approach under Chapter 7 of the AIT.  To be really useful, it needs to be
continued and refined.  
A survey could also be done of those individuals who apply for licensure, registration or
certification as well as the regulatory bodies. This could provide longitudinal follow-up
information on the consequence of being refused or approved. This could include, for instance,
whether rejected applicants were eventually approved, and the impact of moves on earnings for
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individuals whose applications were approved.
KEY KNOWLEDGE GAPS AND  FUTURE RESEARCH PRIORITIES
The most important knowledge gaps concern the extent of the regulatory barriers to
labour mobility and their impacts and costs. Information on the occupational requirements needs
to be collected and analyzed. The Work Destinations Website represents a start, but it is still far
from a complete inventory.
There is also not a very good appreciation of the relative magnitude of the barriers
associated with the occupational requirements for the different professions and trades. One
possibility would be to take the information once collected and quantify it using a methodology
like that employed by Copenhagen Economics (2005) in preparing a quantitative assessment of
the European internal market for services (see Macmillan and Grady, 2007, p17-18 for summary
of methodology). 
There is also relatively little longitudinal information on those in the regulated
professions who either move or contemplate moving. Special survey designed to elicit such
information need to be developed.
There is also not a full understanding of the impact of labour mobility on earnings. It is
important to explore what can be done using the existing data, including the Census, the LAD,
and the SLID from Statistics Canada, and the EI file. Statistics Canada research staff, who are
most familiar with these data sources,  should be consulted in determining the most promising
future research strategies. 
Because of the small numbers of mobile individuals involved in the regulated occupations
and professions and the lack of hard information on them, attempts to identify the costs of
interprovincial labour mobilty barriers using macroeconometric or GE Models are unlikely to be
very fruitful.
SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS
There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the  approach of mutual recognition being
pursued in Canada to eliminate regulatory barriers to labour mobility.  Indeed it is the only one
that is truly compatible with the distribution of powers in Canada’s Constitution. It is also the
approach that has been favoured in other federal or confederal jurisdictions.  
There has also been a fair degree of success in Canada in achieving MRAs. However, the
slow speed of the progress and lack of urgency has been disappointing. To a large extent, this is
the result of the independence of the provincial and territorial regulatory authorities and the lack
of political commitment from provincial and territorial governments to bring their regulatory
authorities in line. 
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The renewed commitment to improve internal trade from the COF and the example of the
TILMA are encouraging.  It will be important to make sure that the commitment results in the
needed action and that the CIT’s new deadline of  April 1, 2009 for all existing regulated
occupations to establish compliance with the labour mobility provisions of the Agreement on
Internal Trade is met. Governments will have to get tough with some of their independent
regulatory agencies who have been allowed to get away with dragging their feet for too long. The
Ontario Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act, 2006 provides an example of such an
approach.  It establishes a Fairness Commissioner to assess and oversee auditing and compliance
with the legislation and with the power to issue compliance orders to regulatory bodies.  Failure
to comply with one of these orders could be punished by fines of up to $50,000 for an individual
and up to $100,000 for a corporation.
The biggest disappointment of all with respect to Chapter 7 has to be the functioning of
the dispute resolution mechanism. It is overly complex and inaccessible.  And worst of all it is
ineffective.  After the long drawn out and still largely unresolved outcome of the two public
accounting cases, the AIT dispute settlement mechanism must be considered a costly waste of
time for anyone seeking redress with respect to a labour mobility measure.  In contrast, the
TILMA has provided an example of a simpler, binding  system.  The CIT was correct to agree
that “an effective, fair, efficient, accountable and enforceable administrative dispute mechanism”
should be implemented by September 2007. This would go a long way towards making the AIT
work better and  ending the deep-rooted, but erroneous, perception that regulatory barriers to
labour mobility are severely undermining the Canadian economic union.
-33-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agreement on Internal Trade ( 2004)  Report of the Article 1704 Panel Concerning a Dispute
Brought Forward by Alberta and British Columbia Against Ontario Regarding Ontario’s
Measures Relating to Dairy Analogs and Dairy Blends, November 10. 
Agreement on Labour Mobility and Recognition of Qualifications, Skills and Work Experience in
the Construction Industry (2006) Between the Government of Ontario and the Gouvernement du
Québec , June 2, 2006.
Audus, Rick and James Ted McDonald (2003) “Employment Insurance and Geographic
Mobility: Evidence from the SLID,” Social Research Demonstration Corporation Working Paper
Series 03-03, April.
Australian Productivity Council (2003) “Evaluation of Mutual Recognition Schemes,” Research
Report, October 8.
Bayoumi, Tamim,  Bennett Sutton, and Andrew Swiston (2006) “Shocking Aspects of Canadian
Labor Markets,” IMF Working Paper No. 83, March.
Bollman, Ray D., Jeff Marshall, Neil Rothwell and Juno Tremblay (2002) “Recent Migration
Patterns in Rural and Small Town Canada,”  Statistics Canada,  Agriculture and Rural Working
Paper Catalogue No.  21-601-MIE2002055, September 11. 
Bonikowska, Aneta, David A. Green and W. Craig Riddell (2006) “Cognitive Skills and
Immigrant Earnings,” paper presented at Canadian Economics Association Annual Meeting in
Montreal, May 26, 2006. 
California Department of Consumer Affairs (2005) Annual Report Fiscal Year 2004-05,
http://www.dca.ca.gov/reports/04_05_annrpt.pdf
Campus Canada  (2005) “Moving Towards the Development of a Common Framework of
Foreign Credential Recognition,” Workshop Report, March 21-22.
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada (2004) “Governance in the Agreement on
Internal Trade.”
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada (2005) “Public Accounting Rights for
Certified General Accountants in Canada,” May.
Certified General Accountants Association of Canada (2006) “Making Trade Dispute Resolution
in Canada Work: Certified General Accountants’ Experience with Canada’s Agreement on
Internal Trade,” April.
Commonwealth of Australia, Productivity Commission (2003)  “Evaluation of Mutual
-34-
Recognition Schemes,” Research Report, October 8.
COMPASS (2004) “Interprovincial Trade Barriers: Seriously Damaging to the Economy and
Standard of Living and Almost as Harmful as Canada-U.S. Barriers,” BDO Dunwoody/Chamber
Weekly CEO/ Business Leader Poll published in Financial Post, September 13, 2004.
Conference Board of Canada (2001) The Brain Gain: The Economic Benefits of Recognizing
Learning and Learning Credentials in Canada, Ottawa, Ontario.
Conference Board of Canada (2005) “An Impact Assessment of the BC/Alberta, Trade,
Investment and Labour Mobility Agreement,”  Ottawa, September.
Conference Board of Canada (2006) Death by a Thousand Paper Cuts: The Effects of Barriers to
Competition on Canadian Productivity, Ottawa, May.
Construction Sector Council (2005) “Working Mobile: A Study of Labour Mobility in Canada’s
Industrial Construction Sector,” Spring.
Copenhagen Economics (2005)  “Economic Assessment of the Internal Market for Services,’
Final Report to the European Commission, January.
Coulombe, Serge and Jean-François Tremblay (2006) “Migration, Human Capital and Skills
Redistribution Across the Canadian Provinces,” PRI-Mobility.
Council of the Federation (2006a) Internal Trade Workplan Progress Report, January,
www.councilofthefederation.ca.
Council of the Federation (2006b) Progress Report Letter Following CIT Meeting, October 3,
www.councilofthefederation.ca. 
DeCruz, Joseph (1992) Interprovincial Trade Barriers and Canadian Competitiveness: Report
on a Survey by the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, November.
Day, Kathleen and Stanley Winer (1994) “Internal Migration and Public Policy,” in A. Masgrove
(ed.) Issues in the Taxation of Individuals (Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
Day, Kathleen M. and Stanley L. Winer (2005) “Policy-induced Internal Migration: An Empirical
Investigation of the Canadian Case,” CESisfo Working Paper No. 1605, November.
Dupuy, Richard, Francine Mayer and René Morissette (2000) “Rural youth : stayers, leavers and
return migrants,” Catalogue number 11F0019MIE2000152, September.
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (2005) “Mobility
in Europe: An Analysis of the Eurobarometer Survey on Geographical and Labour Market
Mobility.
-35-
European Public Administration Network, Human Resources Working Group (2006) “Cross-
border Mobility of Public Sector Workers.”
European Union (2007) “Recognition of Qualifications,”
http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/nav/en/citizens/working/qualification-recognition/general-system/
index_en.html,
Finnie, Ross (2001)  “The effects of inter-provincial mobility on individuals' earnings: panel
model estimates for Canada,” Statistics Canada, catalogue 11F0019MIE2001163, October.
Finnie, Ross (2000)  “Who Moves? A Panel Logit Model Analysis of Inter-provincial Migration
in Canada,” catalogue number 11F0019MIE2000142, September.
Forum of Labour Market Ministers (2003)  “Guidelines for Meeting the Obligations of the
Labour Mobility Chapter,” Revised Edition, February.
Forum of Labour Market Ministers (2005)  “Report of Survey Results: Interprovincial Labour
Mobility in Canada 2004/05,” May 18.
Friedman, Milton (1962) Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
Goodman, Richard M. and John M. Frost (2000) “International Economic Agreements and the
Constitution,” Institute for International Economics, Working Paper 00-2, February.
Gross,  Stanley J, (1986) “Professional Licensure and Quality: The Evidence,” Cato Policy
Analysis No. 79.
Gunderson, Morley (1994) “Barriers to Interprovincial Labour Mobility,”  in Filip Palda (ed.)
Interprovincial Trade Wars: Why the Blockade Must End (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1994),
pp.131-154.
Hailsham, Lord and David Vaughan (eds.) (1986) Law of the European Communities.
Holen, Arlene S. (1965) “Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on Interstate Labor
Mobility and Resource Allocation,” The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 73, No. 5, pp.
492-498.
Hong, Duc Nuygen  (2000) “Restrictions on Trade in Professional Services,” Staff Research
Paper,  Australian Productivity Council, August.
Internal Trade Secretariat (2007a) An Overview of the Internal Trade Agreement,
http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/ait.htm.
Internal Trade Secretariat (2007b), Progress to Date,
http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/progress.htm. 
-36-
Internal Trade Secretariat (2006) Annual Report 2005/2006,
http://www.ait-aci.ca/index_en/reports.htm.
International Monetary Fund (2005) “How Flexible Is the Canadian Economy? An International
Comparison,” in Canada: Selected Issues (Article IV Consultation): 92-100.
Lin, Zhengxi (1995) Interprovincial Labour Mobility in Canada: The Role of Unemployment
Insurance and Social Assistance, HRDC Unemployment Insurance Evaluation Series 21
(Ottawa). 
Lin, Zhengxi (1998) “Foreign-born vs Native-born Canadians: A Comparison of Their
Inter-provincial Labour Mobility,” Statistics Canada, Catalogue No. 11F0019MIE1998114.
Macmillan, Kathleen and Patrick Grady (2007) “Inter-provincial Barriers to
Internal Trade in Goods, Services and Capital,” paper prepared for Industry Canada 
and Human Resources and Social Development Canada, March 31.
Magun, Sunder, Laval Lavallée, Jean-Louis Arcand and François Ethier (1994) “The Impact of
Removing Interprovincial Barriers to Labour Mobility in Canada,” A report prepared for the
Department of Human Resources Development Canada, May 30.
Nguyen-Hong,  Duc (2000) “Restrictions in Trade in Professional Services,’ Staff Research
Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Productivity Commission, August.
Ontario Ministry of Labour (2002) “Ontario Plans to Redesignate Quebec Under Fairness Is A
Two-Way Street Act,” Press Release,  February 11, 2002.
Svorny,  Shirley (1999) “Licensing, Market Entry Regulation,” in Encyclopedia of Law &
Economics (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar and University of Ghent).
